

# NAMIC Policy Briefing

February 2010

## Credit-Based Insurance Scoring: Separating Facts From Fallacies

### Introduction

Credit-based insurance scores have been used by insurance company underwriters and actuaries for nearly two decades to more accurately assess risk and price coverage for automobile and homeowners' insurance policies.

The use of insurance scores encourages competition and enables insurers to offer coverage to more consumers at a fairer price. Furthermore, consumers benefit from insurance scoring because it keeps the insurance marketplace competitive, resulting in lower prices, better service, and more product choices. Insurance scores provide an objective, fair, and consistent tool that insurers use with other information to better predict the likelihood of future claims and the cost of those claims.

During the 1990s, lawmakers and regulators in several states began enacting laws and regulations that established procedures for insurers to follow in using an individual's credit information. In 2002, the National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) created a "Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance," which became the basis for additional legislation in other states. Today, 47 states have laws or regulations pertaining to credit-based insurance scoring.

In spite of an apparent consensus on this issue, some public officials and advocacy groups have continued to press for further restrictions on the use of insurance scores, or to prohibit the practice entirely.

This *Policy Briefing* provides a review of the evolution of credit-based insurance scoring, the laws governing its practice, some misconceptions about insurance scoring, and studies that have examined the impact of insurance scoring on consumers. It is intended to educate legislators and other policymakers who may be unfamiliar with insurance scoring and its utility as a predictive tool that benefits insurers and consumers alike.

### Credit Scores and Insurance Scores: An Important Distinction

Insurance scores are not credit scores. Credit scores predict the likelihood that an individual will default or be delinquent in paying a credit obligation. By contrast, a credit-based insurance score predicts the likely "loss ratio relativity" of a particular individual. A loss ratio is the amount paid out by an insurance company in claims divided by the amount collected in premiums. Loss ratio relativity measures whether an individual will experience more or fewer losses than average.<sup>2</sup>

Another important distinction between a credit score and a credit-based insurance score is that the latter is only one of more than two dozen factors that are used by insurers to make an underwriting or rating decision about an individual. Other factors typically include an individual's motor vehicle report, claims history, or the condition of one's home.

### The NCOIL Model

As noted above, NCOIL adopted a model law in 2002 (updated in 2005) that imposes conditions on insurers' use of credit information in personal insurance transactions. Twenty-six<sup>3</sup> states have adopted the model while other states have adopted at least portions of the model in their statutes.

The model imposes at least eight specific restrictions on how insurers use credit information in underwriting or rating risks. For example, the model prohibits insurers from using an insurance score that is calculated

#### Headquarters

3601 Vincennes Road  
Indianapolis, IN 46268  
317.875.5250  
Fax: 317.879.8408

#### Washington Office

122 C Street, N.W.  
Suite 540  
Washington, D.C. 20001  
202.628.1558  
Fax: 202.628.1601

[www.namic.org](http://www.namic.org)

Founded in 1895, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies is the largest, most diverse national insurance trade association in the United States. NAMIC represents the interests of its property/casualty insurance company members and their policyholders. NAMIC's membership includes farm mutual insurance companies, single-state and regional writers, and national insurers operating across North America. The more than 1,400 NAMIC members underwrite 41 percent of the automobile and homeowners insurance market and 31 percent of the business insurance market in the United States.

**NAMIC**<sup>®</sup>  
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES

EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY  
STRATEGIC PUBLIC POLICY  
VALUABLE MEMBER SERVICES

using income, gender, address, zip code, race, ethnicity, religion, marital status, or an individual's nationality.

The model also prohibits an insurer from denying, canceling or non-renewing a personal insurance policy solely on the basis of credit information. An insurer cannot deny insurance coverage solely on the grounds that the consumer does not have a credit account.

The model outlines a process for insurers to follow if they raise a policyholder's premium or decline to renew coverage based on credit information. Other provisions lay out procedures that a consumer can follow in challenging a credit report or in challenging an adverse action taken against them by an insurer.

In response to the economic crisis, NCOIL amended its model in July 2009 by moving the extraordinary life circumstances (ELC) drafting note into the body of the model and broadening its provisions. The amendment states, in part, that upon written request from an applicant for insurance or an insured, an insurer that utilizes credit information as part of its underwriting process shall "provide reasonable exceptions to the insured's rates, rating classifications, company or tier placement, or underwriting rules or guidelines for a consumer who has experienced and whose credit information has been directly influenced by events deemed to be ELC." This would include federal or state-declared catastrophes; serious illness or injury to a consumer or his/her immediate family; death of a spouse, child, or parent; divorce or involuntary interruption of legally owed alimony or support payments; identity theft; temporary and involuntary loss of employment for three months or more; and military deployment overseas, among other items.

## **Insurance Scoring Misconceptions**

The issue of credit-based insurance scoring can lead to emotional debate among competing interest groups, which can often result in several misconceptions about how insurers use insurance scores. As a general matter, such misconceptions lose sight of the fact that insurance is a competitive business, and insurers use insurance scores because they want to offer products to more individuals at the lowest price possible. Some critics have argued that credit-based insurance scoring should be prohibited because it unfairly discriminates against minorities. This is a specious claim because insurance scoring does not consider characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, or income level.

Every empirical study has concluded that insurance scoring is neutral on its face with respect to race, ethnicity, and income, and is applied neutrally by insurers. The use of insurance scoring is not motivated by a desire to discriminate based on race, ethnicity, or income nor do insurers collect or use this information. Nevertheless, some critics contend that even if the correlation between credit scores and loss history is statistically

## **Insurance Scoring and the Financial Crisis**

In some recent published reports, critics of insurance scoring have suggested that the practice is particularly problematic due to the current economic crisis. However, this contention is based on unproven assumptions and a lack of understanding regarding why insurers use credit-based insurance scores. In fact, this underwriting tool remains an effective and important risk assessment mechanism.

### **Scores have remained very stable**

Fair Isaac, a leading provider of credit-based insurance scores, found in a recent countrywide study that average scores have remained virtually the same for the general population. Noting the significance of this finding during an economic downturn with a growing number of people who are delinquent, Fair Isaac suggests that the "overall stability of scores may be caused by a greater number of consumers making certain to pay all bills on time, paying down outstanding balances, and perhaps not seeking more credit obligations." In other words, "more and more consumers appear to be realizing the value of prudent financial and credit management practices."

### **Not all credit-related incidents will affect insurance underwriting and rating**

It is undeniable that a growing number of consumers are experiencing credit-related incidents such as loan defaults and foreclosures, but it is important not to make assumptions or generalizations about the impact of such incidents on insurance underwriting and rating. Some individuals who experience such incidents may not see an impact because they previously had credit issues that were already reflected in scores. And it is important to remember that insurers use scores in a variety of ways to differentiate applicants and insureds on a relative basis in terms of insurance risk, not credit risk, to compete for and price business appropriately. Fair Isaac found in its most recent score performance studies that its insurance scores "continue to appropriately rank-order consumers based on insurance risk." Even if credit scores were to deteriorate in general, those with the higher insurance scores would still benefit, and there is no reason to expect that the percentages of those who benefit would change.

### **The financial crisis demonstrates the importance of risk assessment**

While there has been much discussion over assignment of blame for the current economic crisis, it is apparent that it is rooted in a failure to properly assess risk. It is only due to insurers' recognition of credit-based insurance scoring as a highly valuable risk assessment tool that it has become a common practice. It would be both ironic and inappropriate for a financial crisis caused by failure to assess risk to prompt policymakers to take a valuable risk assessment tool out of the hands of insurers.

valid, insurance scoring should be banned if it produces a disproportionate or disparate impact on particular racial, ethnic, or income groups.

“Disparate impact” is a legal term that refers to situations in which a policy or practice has the effect of disproportionately harming or excluding members of a group defined by race, ethnicity, disability, or gender—even though the challenged practice makes no reference to these characteristics and even though the resulting adverse group impact was unintentional.

Disparate *treatment*, on the other hand, refers to situations in which a decision-maker intentionally discriminates against people *because of* their race, ethnicity, disability, or gender. Intentional discrimination based on such characteristics is what most people think of when they hear the term unfair discrimination, and it is generally illegal under federal and state law.

Credit-based insurance scoring does not involve disparate treatment of customers based on race, ethnicity, income, or any other legally prohibited characteristic. To the contrary, insurers apply the same credit standards to all consumers—in other words, insurance scoring is a means of affording equal treatment in the underwriting process to all individuals regardless of race, ethnicity, or income. Policymakers should consider which form of discrimination is truly unfair—disparate impact on groups or disparate treatment of individuals.

Even if one is inclined to accept the notion that disparate impact somehow equates to unfair discrimination, it is important to note that as used in the courts, a showing of disparate impact serves only to establish a *rebuttable presumption* that illegal discrimination has occurred. Moreover, courts have generally confined use of the disparate impact theory to cases involving allegations of employment discrimination. In employment cases, defendants may rebut the presumption of unfair discrimination by demonstrating that the practice having a disparate impact is justified by “business necessity.”

In the few instances where disparate impact analysis has been applied to settings similar to insurance underwriting and pricing—e.g., mortgage lending and the granting of credit—the courts have upheld challenged practices where defendants have shown a “legitimate business justification” for the practice. Because of its proven validity as an underwriting variable, it is undeniable that insurers have a legitimate business justification for using credit-based insurance scores.

Furthermore, insurer use of insurance scores is subject to the protections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, federal and state anti-discrimination laws, and state insurance rating laws. These laws prohibit insurers from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or national origin and include strong penalties for any violations.

Another popular misconception is that an individual’s insurance score will be affected if too many requests are made to examine the individual’s credit information. This is not an issue in states that have adopted the NCOIL model, as it expressly prohibits insurers from treating as a negative factor credit inquiries not initiated by the consumer or inquiries requested by consumers to examine their own credit information.

## **Research and Reports on Credit-Based Insurance Scoring**

Since 1999, at least a dozen studies have examined credit-based insurance scoring. They have tended to fall into two broad categories: those studies that have looked at the predictability of insurance scores on loss performance or insurance risk and those that have examined the impact of insurance scoring on consumers, especially minority or low-income populations.

Among the studies worth noting are three that employed multivariate analysis techniques. In 2003, EPIC Actuaries, in the largest and most comprehensive study ever undertaken at the time, found that a consumer’s credit-based insurance score is directly connected to that consumer’s propensity for auto insurance loss. Even more significant, the EPIC study found that insurance scores are consistently among the most important rating variables used by insurers. The EPIC study looked at 2.7 million automobile insurance policies and found that the propensity for loss decreased as the insurance score increased.<sup>4</sup>

In 2005, the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) completed an exhaustive study based on data obtained from six leading insurers for approximately two million automobile and homeowners’ policies. The TDI report concluded that “for both personal auto liability and homeowners, credit score was related to claim experience even after considering other commonly used rating variables. *This means that credit score provides insurers with additional predictive information distinct from other rating variables. By using credit scores, insurers can better classify and rate risks based on differences in claims experience.*”<sup>5</sup> In July 2007, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released a study that reached conclusions virtually identical to those of the TDI report. It also found that when credit-based insurance scoring is used, 59 percent of consumers pay less for insurance.<sup>6</sup>

In 2005, the Arkansas Department of Insurance began conducting an annual survey on the effect of the state's insurance scoring law on insurance consumers. Its 2008 survey concluded that of 3,033,996 personal lines policies written or renewed in that year, 41.9 percent of customers received a discount, 13.9 percent received an increase, and the remaining 45.1 percent of consumers saw a neutral impact due to insurer use of insurance scores.

In 2009, the Consumer Advocate for the Iowa Department of Insurance commissioned researchers from St. Ambrose University to survey Iowa consumer attitudes toward credit-based insurance scoring. Seventy-one percent of Iowans felt that credit scores should not be used to determine insurance rates, but fewer than 30 percent understood why insurers use credit scores. The report found that Iowans' "opinions seem to be based on widely-held, but incorrect, perceptions that credit scores are not predictive of risky behavior that might lead to a tendency to file claims."<sup>81</sup> More generally, the report noted that "consumers are seriously uninformed about insurance fundamentals. Iowa consumers do not have a clear notion of what it means to spread the risk."<sup>92</sup> The report suggested that to enhance public understanding, "the legislature might include a block of instruction at the high school level on both insurance and the wide-ranging effects of credit scores."<sup>10</sup>

## Conclusion

Effective underwriting allows insurers to operate profitably and to compete in the marketplace. Likewise, appropriate underwriting ensures that consumers benefit by not subsidizing other policyholders who pose worse insurance risks, resulting in unfair cross-subsidization among risk classes.

Banning or limiting the use of any valid underwriting or rating factor that is known to be predictive of insurance losses leads to decreased coverage availability and higher insurance prices. A legislator or regulator considering a prohibition on the use of credit-based insurance scoring should be prepared to explain to constituents, including those of every ethnic background and income level, why he or she decided they should pay more for insurance.

Experience has shown time and again how limitations on insurers' use of proven risk factors such as geography and age of driver have destroyed competitive markets and increased prices. A ban on the use of credit-based insurance scores would be counterproductive and would harm, rather than benefit, consumers.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies has compiled a chart showing the actions taken in various states with regard to credit-based insurance scoring. The chart can be found at [www.namic.org/compliance/CreditBasedInsuranceScoring.pdf](http://www.namic.org/compliance/CreditBasedInsuranceScoring.pdf)

<sup>2</sup>The Fair Isaac website ([www.fairisaac.com/ficx/](http://www.fairisaac.com/ficx/)) provides an excellent explanation of how credit risk and credit-based insurance scoring models work.

<sup>3</sup>A copy of the NCOIL Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance can be ordered at the NCOIL website ([www.ncoil.org/](http://www.ncoil.org/)).

<sup>4</sup>Michael J. Miller and Richard A. Smith, "The Relationship of Credit-Based Insurance Scores to Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Loss Propensity: An Actuarial Study (June 2003). [www.ask-epic.com/Publications/Relationship%20of%20Credit%20Scores\\_062003.pdf](http://www.ask-epic.com/Publications/Relationship%20of%20Credit%20Scores_062003.pdf)

<sup>5</sup>"Supplemental Report to the 79<sup>th</sup> Legislature: Use of Credit Information by Insurers in Texas: The Multivariate Analysis," Texas Department of Insurance (Jan. 31, 2005), p. 2. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>6</sup>Federal Trade Commission, "Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Impacts on Consumers of Automobile Insurance," (July 2007). [www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA\\_Report\\_Credit-Based\\_Insurance\\_Scores.pdf](http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-Based_Insurance_Scores.pdf)

<sup>7</sup>Information about the annual credit scoring reports can be obtained by accessing the Arkansas Insurance Department website at: <http://insurance.arkansas.gov/>

<sup>8</sup>Randy L. Richards et al., *Use of Credit Scores by the Insurance Industry: Iowa Consumers' Perspectives*, St. Ambrose University, December 2009, p. 31.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid*, p. 32.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid*